II. To the Initial Arguments

253. As to the first initial argument [n.203] one must say that he who held the major that ‘nothing can be elsewhere while remaining in its place save by conversion of something else into it’ would have to gloss the proposition about what first begins to be elsewhere, and say that the properties begin to be here concomitantly but not first.

254. But against this:

First, because it at least maintains that something is here without conversion of something else into it, and consequently that conversion is not the proper formal idea, nor the precise change, for being here [n.29]. And besides, the presence of the soul and of the body here are different, because their foundation is different. Therefore, besides the presence by which the body is formally here, one must posit another by which the soul is here, and this presence is not obtained through conversion; therefore the major is false.

255. I respond, therefore, that it poses no difficulty for me, because I do not believe the said proposition to be true, as was said in the first question of this distinction [nn.42-55]. For conversion is not the reason for such presence, nor is change to such presence properly the reason, but the divine power alone, by a different change (which is not conversion), makes it the case that what is elsewhere has this presence here. And divine power can do this for the parts and properties of the body as for the whole body.

256. To the second [n.204]:

Either one holds [n.253] that the body, which is what the species of bread first signifies, does not per se contain the blood as some part of it, according to what was said above in the solution when making the supposition clear [n.214]. And then the response is easy, that the blood is only concomitantly under the species of bread, and then it is not there twice by force of the sacrament, nor yet is it in vain concomitantly under the species of bread, since it is under the species of wine by force of the sacrament, for this is to save the truth of the thing contained, which, wherever it is posited, always has the same absolute features. Nor does it follow that the blood begins to be here after it was here, when speaking of the same mode of being; for it was here concomitantly and begins to be here by force of the consecration.

But if it be held that the blood is per se part of the body as the body is the thing first signified by the species of bread, then one must say that the blood is here twice by force of the sacrament; but still not in the same way, because it is under the species of wine per se and first, for it is the first thing signified by the wine. Now it is under the species of bread per se but not first, rather as something belonging to what is first signified. Nor then is it in vain, because it is per se under the species of bread, so that the truth of the thing first contained may be preserved. Nor does it begin to be after it first was, though it did per se have being there.

257. To the third [n.205] I say that, once the extremes are posited, there is no necessity that a relation coming from outside necessary follow. For such a relation differs in this way from a relation properly speaking, or from a relation that comes from within. But the presence in question here is a relation coming from outside.

258. As to the next [n.206], although Christ’s body could be posited to be here without the other things, namely without the soul and the rest, yet once the existence of the body with these properties and parts is posited, it cannot be here without them, because of the contradiction between affirmation and negation of something absolute under two respects.

259. From this solution [n.258] is made plain what is first in the Eucharist as the thing signified and contained, and what is first concomitantly; for the former is that without which the thing first signified would not have being in a natural mode. And it could also be said that, when the existence of the body here and there has been posited, those things that are in the body under one existence are in it under the other (if one speaks of absolute forms as well). Nor yet does a contradiction follow, namely that it is a quantum and not a quantum; rather it is not a quantum here with a quantity that might be here, but with a quantity that is in heaven.

260. There is the following reason for this: In the case of things that are contingently conjoined with each other and with a same third thing, one of them can agree with that third thing without the other agreeing with it; but the presence of a substance here and the presence of its quantity are contingently conjoined both with each other and in respect of the third thing that is ‘a body being a quantum’; therefore a body can remain a quantum when one presence is posited without the other.

261. And the major seems plain, because there is no reason for their inseparability on their part among themselves, since they are contingently conjoined with each other; nor even is there this reason for inseparability on the part of the third thing, because they are contingently conjoined with that third thing.

262. Proof of the minor:

For it is plain that the presence of the substance of the body and the presence of its quantity are different, and that neither necessarily includes the other, because neither is of the per se essence of the other nor a per se cause of it; therefore they are contingently conjoined with each other.

I prove also the second part of the minor, namely that they are contingently disposed to the third thing that is the body being a quantum, because an absolute form perfects its perfectible object naturally before this sort of perfectible object or the form has a relation coming from outside. And this would be more evident if the argument were about body and soul, for the conjunction of the soul with the body is required for the existence of the composite substance. But the composite substance is naturally prior to any relation coming from outside. Therefore a substance quantum or an animated body does not have this presence or that presence (and this to something extrinsic to them), save as this presence comes to them contingently and as naturally posterior.

263. And this could be briefly argued thus: In the case of what can exist without any conjuncts whose conjunction is contingent, one of these conjuncts can precisely be without the other. The animate body or a substance quantum can be without those two presences, namely the presence of this part of the species of the Eucharist and the presence of that part; and these two presences are contingently conjoined, because neither is per se cause of the other. Therefore a substance quantum or the animate body can be with one presence and not with the other; and then nothing else would exist save that a quantity is informing what it can perfect, but it does not have the double presence the way what it can perfect has; and so what it can perfect has quantum everywhere but not with a quantity that is present everywhere.

264. On the contrary: wherever a body is a quantum, it has there what is the formal principle of being a quantum; but it does not have it there unless it is present there;     therefore etc     .

265. Again, of what sort something is here, of that sort would it be if every other being were in some way or other, possible or not, circumscribed from it; but if quantity were circumscribed under natural being, that body would not be a quantum; therefore it would not be a quantum as it is here.

266. Again, the thing of the Eucharist could be truly contained there without its anywhere having existence in the natural mode, as is plain from the first article of this question or solution [nn.222-245]. But if it were nowhere else and the only thing here first contained is the substance, then the substance would not be a quantum; and the sort it would then be in absolute form, of that sort it is now;     therefore etc     .

267. As to the argument to the contrary [n.222-230], about the contingent conjunction of the presences with each other and with a same third thing composed of absolute parts - the answer is plain from what has already been said (look for the response [nn.222-230]).a

a.a [Interpolation] To the first [n.261] one can speak by distinguishing the major: either it means what has a quantity informing it there, and thus I concede the point; or it means what has a present quantity, and thus I deny it.

     To the second [n.262] I say that quantity is always in a body, whatever sort of quantity it has; rather, although it not have a quantity as here present, yet it has it as informing it, and thus is the body a quantum.

     To the third [n.262] I say that there would be a quantity in the body of Christ, though not in natural mode or with a quantity that is present, but with a quantity that is inherent.